President Bush Under the Burkean Magnifying Glass

President Bush Under the Burkean Magnifying Glass:
Focusing on Possible Agendas For Secession
From The 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty

[written December, 2001]


It is often very difficult to “ascertain the full picture” for any given event, for often various pieces of the puzzle are denied us – especially those concerning motivation or agenda. Motivation is such a key aspect of interest, that its discovery is vital to categorization, for example: a murder case might become reduced to mere manslaughter should "intent" not be proven, and the benefit of the doubt is weighed heavily in those cases, so prosecutors must use their every means to establish that a motive existed and was acted upon with "the intent" to realize the ends to that motive. Such is the issue with America's latest tactical move in international affairs, wherein the United States has sought to abandon a critical treaty – the underlying agenda for this act is elusive at best.

However, one rhetorical perspective is significant for the discovery, or at least the attempt of discovery, of missing pieces to an event, be it a murder case or an international incident. Kenneth Burke’s approach for analyzing dynamics, called “dramatism” [often referred to as the Pentad] is especially useful for this particular act. By separating out all the elements into their respective dramatic categories – being act, agent, agency (utility), scene (context), and purpose – we are better able to discern which-ever category is not sufficiently filled via direct evidence or representation. According to Burke, via Malcom Sillars and Bruce Gronbeck:
"These five principles stand as key terms in a ‘grammar of motives.’ Together they permit the critic to understand the relationship of the elements in a story by highlighting the different interpretations that can be made, depending upon which term is being featured" (Sillars, p. 229).


During the last few months, President Bush has toyed with the notion of seceding from the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile treaty. Using the Burkean Pentad, this paper will analyze the latest events surrounding President Bush’s decision to break free from this treaty in order to discern possible motivation, purpose, or any other matters from a purely rhetorical view – in other words, with no real agenda being disclosed:

Act – pushing through legislation which would allow the United States to withdraw from an international treaty that restricts the use of certain nuclear capabilities.

Agent – President Bush.

Agency – current “anti-terrorist” climate. According to President Bush, we, the Americans, have a new enemy, and the old tactics aren’t good enough. "I have concluded the ABM treaty hinders our government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks,'' the president said (Fournier).

Context – [complicated in nature as is the norm in international issues]:
1. Precedent of U.S. Military industrial complex to use wars and/or “threats to national security” to generate funding. Most recent and direct precedent being the use of “anti-terrorism, and the defense of our freedoms” as justifications for the funding of intelligence organizations.

2. No clear definition of just “whom” would be targeted, considering that terrorists can’t be equated to nation states, thus there are neither clear boundaries nor clear limitations to this latest presidential maneuver.

3. Nations that have nuclear capability and potential for hostility are numerically discrete, and very few. Russia [definitely not considered a “Soviet Union”] poses no current threat – even if they have the capability (arguably), they do not wish to engage in hostile action against the U.S. for economic reasons. This leaves only six possible targets for any ballistic activity, in ascending order of probability:
a. North Korea – once very powerful, militarily speaking, they now have problems feeding their own people, so this is the least likely target. More can be done on economic and logistic levels.

b. Palestine – but Israel has them under their thumb, to the point that many are calling for U.N. intervention [in fact the Arab League called for a special meeting of the U.N. security council – but the resolution was vetoed by the United States (Lederer)].

c. Syria – often accused of supporting terrorist activities.

d. Iraq – this would satisfy those who were left wanting when we allowed Hussein to stay in power.

e. “Rogue” states with nuclear capability. Would capability here denote an actual arsenal, or merely the ability to produce nuclear grade material? So the likes of Pakistan and India might be added to the list. Unless, of course, the focus is directed at whom-ever the U.S. defines to be “rogue” and then anyone could feasibly become open game.

f. China – this country is no Iraq, for they have extensive military potential both on land and at sea. An army large enough to take on all the major Western powers if it had the chance to engage in combat on an even playing field.

4. Russia and China are vehemently opposed to U.S. withdrawal, and world-wide sentiment quickly follows suit.

Purpose – this is the underlying question being addressed by this paper: What is Bush’s agenda? The possibilities are as numerous:
1. To drive Russia further into economic submission by forcing it to waste funding on counter-measures.

2. To increase the psychological and political threat against all nations in the world who would potentially harbor, train, support and/or fund terrorists. It is possible that many nations are seeing the U.S.’s current position weakening as it seeks to police the world, and they might wish to take advantage of that perception.

3. To combat terrorism directly? That’s a tough sell, for one can not fire a bullet at an abstraction of behavior, let alone send a nuclear weapon after it. Terrorists can strike anywhere, anytime, and do not necessarily have to utilize “conventional weapons” (as noted on the occasions in the Oklahoma bombing, which used agricultural products, and in the attack in New York on the World Trade Center, which used civilian aircraft). Just how would President Bush decide which city to bomb with a nuclear warhead in retaliation of a terrorist attack? The last city(-ies) in which the terrorist(s) lived, or the place of birth?

4. To target the last major player which has any capability of threatening the U.S., being China specifically, perhaps with the ulterior agenda of forcing the introduction of an open market – in which case China would then face economic submission by Western powers, much as Russia currently does.

5. For the simple reason of routing funds to the military-industrial complex, under the guise of “combating this new enemy.”

That President Bush is hurting for popularity points is an understatement. That President Bush, like any other President (or any other politician for that matter), is being lobbied by Political Action Committees is a given – and the military-industrial complex lobbyists wield a mighty sword on this level, almost as mighty as the tobacco or beef PACs. That President Bush will use the current American popular sentiment to his benefit is clear, and it would be irresponsible for a President not to look to this measurement as a guide for action, especially when one’s popularity from the start was in a state of desperation.

What is surprising – “alarming” might be the appropriate word – is that President Bush might be jeopardizing the very national security he is proposing to defend, for during the last decade the entire globe has been on a track to reduce, if not eventually eradicate, the nuclear arsenals, with the understanding that the very presence of nuclear arsenals provided a greater threat than the countries that might control them. The “escalation of arms in the interest of national security” has long been considered a faulty tactic, and even the mention of seceding from a treaty restricting the production of said arms places the United States in the position of the aggressor, regardless if President Bush is successful in pushing through the necessary legislation.

The response from Russia is not so surprising. Though it is obviously not in Russia's best interest to see this treaty dismissed, there is very little that Russia, or any country for that matter, can do about it – all of Russia's threats, including the abandonment of the subsequent SALT I and II treaties, thus enabling the practice of installing “multiple warheads on ICBMs” (inter-continental ballistic missiles), were summarily ignored by Bush's administration. Just this last Thursday night, December 13th, 2001, Russia's President, Putin, finally resigned his effort to keep the treaty alive:
"Top Russian officials fumed, issued threats and finally accepted America's unilateral decision to scrap the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile treaty. Russian President Vladimir Putin said that abandoning the 29-year-old treaty was a ‘mistake’…President Bush's decision to scrap the ABM treaty marks a break in decades of nuclear arms control" (Seward).

Exploiting the “terrorist threat” as a means of manipulating the American public is fast becoming an uncontrollable category of government behavior: first was the diversion of funds from Social Security to intelligence agencies (a diversion which was rejected prior to the events of “September 11th”); next came the introduction of the war policy to conduct closed trials of “terrorists” via military tribunals (this policy is under heavy fire); then came the policy to arrest and detain anyone that the federal government felt to be a “risk” – without benefit of appeal, or the protection of Miranda (for this is not a civil issue, but considered military in nature); in quick succession was the policy to intersect the communication between potential terrorists and their respective attorneys without a warrant. And now, via this break from a well-established treaty, President Bush is attempting to take further advantage of the public and political atmosphere.

Of special interest is the fact that Israel has taken President Bush’s rhetorical cue and followed suit: citing the “eradication” of terrorist activities as the specific motivation for its latest drive into Palestine and for breaking off communications with Yasser Arafat. Arafat accused Israel of trying to usurp his control, an accusation Israel denies:
“We don't want to topple Arafat. We don't want to topple the Palestinian Authority. We want to stop terrorism – that's all” (Amr).

This latest development is not entirely without warrant, for two specific reasons: 1) Arafat was the leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization – once considered a terrorist group (of course with a positive agenda to free Palestinian territory from Israeli control); and 2) for decades, Israel and its citizens have lived with the terrorist threat, and as of the writing of this paper there were serious bombings (many, and with numerous fatalities – including some Orthodox Jews). However, it must be noted that Israel itself is a particular country that harbors, supports, supplies and trains terrorists – via the Mossad (the Israeli intelligence counterpart to the CIA). So, although this might be a situation where “the pot is calling the kettle black,” Israel still has the limited sentimental advantage so long as the world associates “terrorism” with “Islam.”

Without even considering the latest actions of Bush, it is possible that no President has had this much political power, control and leverage since Franklin Roosevelt. Also, President Bush has successfully diverted the public eye from national issues where he has little effect, to the international arena where he has near-unopposed blessings to route terrorism [of course many of these – some of the most important – blessings were quickly withdrawn when Bush proposed to withdraw from the treaty]. Bush is clearly taking advantage of the new-found patriotism – every flag flown from every car window is a vote of confidence, and very few would dare speak out against policies which are labeled “anti-terrorist” for fear that they, the speakers, themselves would be labeled as un-patriotic, un-American, or worse, a potential terrorist who might suddenly be detained.

Some Democrats have strongly and publicly opposed this latest move on Bush’s part, but they have to be very careful with how they word their rhetoric, for the President has a captive audience. “September 11th” so scarred the public that the imagery (repeated over and over in the media till it became imprinted in every mind’s eye) is as strong three months later as the day of those atrocities. “September 11th” so hurt the pride of Americans, who have not had a direct blow by a foreign entity of this magnitude since “December 7th, 1941,” that they are willing to turn the Arab world into a glass parking lot, and nuclear weapons would do just that [many programs, even MTV, have attempted to re-direct this anti-Arab sentiment, hoping to convince Americans that not all Arabs, or Muslims, are “evil,” as the political spotlight might portray].



Therefore, in this particular case of international affairs, we know exactly what the act is (attempting to secede from a treaty), who the agent is (President Bush), what the agency is (“anti-terrorist” sentiment), and the general context of this event (in terms of precedent, world-wide support, and effectiveness of a nuclear approach to terrorism). What we are missing is the purpose (the motivation) for withdrawing.

Clearly, based on the fact that a nuclear assault on an abstraction (“terrorism”) is practically impossible, even if one defines a host nation as being “terrorist through complicity,” there is no way that the simple condition, as statement by Bush, that “we have a new enemy,” is a sufficient justification for such a withdrawal from a treaty seeking to limit escalation in nuclear weapons. Therefore, the logical assertion follows that Bush has an ulterior agenda – discovering what the specific agenda might be is not purpose of this paper, but rather, demonstrating that an ulterior motive must exist, one which is not an can not be publicly disclosed (in light of the possibility that sentiment would quickly turn against Bush if it was).

With respect to the complexity of this matter, other rhetorical perspectives (being narrative, metaphor, etc.) would not be sufficient for such an analysis, and in fact, might prove contrary to our goal of understanding Bush’s reasons for potentially placing all of America at a higher risk of a nuclear war. Getting lost in the pursuit of narratives, for example, might send someone on a wild goose chase for potential agendas – the “conspiracy theory” scenario. The Burkean system for analysis allows us to focus directly on the task at hand, and allows us to draw sincere conclusions with regard to President Bush’s purpose for wanting to secede from the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty.





Works Cited

Amr, Wafa. “Arafat Says Sharon Trying to Topple Him.” On-line yahoo web-page, last viewed 12/14/2001:
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20011205/wl/mideast_dc_466.html

Fournier, Ron. “U.S. Withdraws From ABM Treaty.” Associated Press. On-line yahoo web-page, last viewed 12/14/2001:
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20011213/pl/bush_missile_defense_42.html

Lederer, Edith M. “U.S. Vetoes UN Mideast Resolution.” Associated Press. On-line yahoo web-page, last viewed 12/15/2001:
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20011215/ts/un_palestinians_israel_7.html

Seward, Deborah. "Russia Accepts U.S. ABM Withdrawal.” Associated Press. On-line yahoo web-page, last viewed 12/14/2001:
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20011214/wl/russia_us.html

Sillars, Malcom O., Gronbeck, Bruce E. Communication Criticism: Rhetoric, Social Codes, Cultural Studies. Prospect Heights: Waveland Press, 2001.